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Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World: 
Property Rights without Sovereignty 
Henry R. Hertzfeld* and Frans G. von der Dunk"* 
International agreements declare that no government can claim outer space 
or celestial bodies in outer space as its own.' Private firms seeking to invest in 
potential space enterprises frequently point to these provisions as a major barrier 
to the future commercial development of space. Such businesses contend that 
the absence of property rights prevent them from obtaining external financing, 
hinder the protection of their investments in space, and deprive them of the 
assurance that they can appropriate income from their investment. In short, the 
lack of sovereignty in space jeopardizes the ability to make profits from private 
investment. 
Dr. Henry R. Hertzfeld, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School of International 
Affairs, Space Policy Institute and the Center for International Science and Technology Policy, 
George Washington University, is an expert in the economic, legal, and policy issues of space and 
advanced technological development. He has served as a Senior Economist and Policy Analyst at 
both NASA and the National Science Foundation, and has been a consultant to many agencies 
and organizations. He is the co-editor of Space Economics ( A N  1992), as well as many articles on 
space economic and legal issues. Dr. Hertzfeld holds a BA from the University of Pennsylvania, a 
MA from Washington University, a PhD in economics from Temple University. He also has J D  
from the George Washington University and is a member of the Bar in Pennsylvania and the 
District of Columbia. 
** Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk is Director of Space Law Research at the International Institute of 
Air and Space Law at Leiden University and Assistant Professor in Public International Law at the 
same University. He has published over 80 amdes and presented papers to many conferences 
around the world. He has-served as adviser to the Dutch and other Governments, the European 
Commission, ESA, the UN, the OECD and others on a number of issues related to space 
activities (space policy, privatization of space activities, GNSS, satellite communications, radio 
astronomy, earth observation). He received a Distinguished Service Award from the International 
Institute of Space Law (IISL). 
I Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), art 11, 18 UST 2410, 2413 (1969) 
(hereinafter Outer Space Treaty). 
Published in CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, v.6, no.1 (Summer 2005), pp. 81-99.
Chicago Journal of International Law 
This article will critique those claims, arguing that most property rights 
exist in space and that the lack of sovereignty does not pose current or near- 
term problems for the types of business ventures likely to be developed in space. 
Furthermore, even in the case of future ventures, solutions based on terrestrial 
models would permit private companies to operate in space with reasonable 
reliance of the right to appropriate income from their investments. 
The most threatening current problem surrounding the issue of real 
property rights in space is in actuality not related to space entrepreneurship. It 
instead arises from shortsighted greed premised on misinterpretations of treaties 
and other applicable laws. For example, several companies have been selling land 
on the moon and issuing "deeds" to that land, behavior whlch unequivocally 
violates space law treaties. If the public perceives that this action is legal, as 
evidenced by a lack of government willingness in putting a halt to these 
activities, serious harm could result in the future. 
Regardless of this near-term problem, it is important to evaluate the true 
meaning of the lack of sovereignty in space in a commercial context. Following 
such analysis, this Article concludes that the lack of sovereignty will not deter 
future private space ventures to the extent commonly believed. Ownership 
problems raised by international agreements have solutions not requiring a 
major change in existing space law, but rather carefully drafted additions and 
amendments to the current legal regime. 
11. PROPERTY RIGHTS THAT EXIST I N  SPACE 
There are actually a wide variety of space activities involving clearly 
delineated ownership recognized by national legal bodies throughout the world. 
First, anydung that is launched into space is deemed to be owned by the 
launching party or state, including the launch vehicle, all of its associated stages 
and parts, and the payload that is placed into space.2 Not only do property rights 
attach to these objects, but the owner(s) can be held singularly and jointly liable 
for damage caused by these objects-if the owner is either itself the government 
of a launching state, or held to reimburse any international claims to be paid by 
such a government.3 Thus, sovereignty in some form exists for satellites and 
aboard space stations. 
2 Id, art VIII. 
3 The Liability Convention imposes absolute liability on the launching state(s) for terrestrial damage 
from space objects. In addition, the launching state(s) of space objects, including debris, that 
collide with other space objects and cause damage can be found liable following a showing of 
negligence. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
(1972), art IV, 24 UST 2389, 2393 (1973) (hereinafter Liability Convention). Obviously, problems 
of identifying the object's owner and proving damage often arise. Also, technical definitions, such 
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Similarly, ownership of permanent structures that might be constructed on 
celestial bodies, including the moon, will vest in the company or state building 
the structure, at least to the extent it is placed "on a celestial body.'* With regard 
to any structure essentially made from locally avdable resources, there are no 
clear rules, and it may be valuable to establish clarity on this subject. 
Commercial space today is dominated by communications satellites owned 
by private companies or national governments. These national governments and 
the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") allocate the right to use 
spectrum to these communications sate~lites.~ Although this right to use the 
spectrum is not exactly a traditional property right, it does grant use of a limited 
resource in space for business purposes for the lifetime of the particular satellite 
proposed to be used. 
Anything taken from space and returned to the earth becomes the property 
of the person, company, or government that performs the action, given the 
absence of United Nations treaty provisions prohibiting such ownership. Added 
legal certainty may eventually become necessary to prevent the undue stifling of 
relevant private interests, especially with regard to Anerals and other potentially 
valuable resources that could be mined from celestial bodies. But as nations 
become increasingly aware of the possibility of inflicting environmental damage 
on celestial boles, most will ltkely limit any government or private activity that 
might endanger lunar or other celestial envir~nrnents.~ 
The United Nations Treaties on Outer Space contain no explicit provisions 
about intellectual property rights for things made or invented in space. However, 
as what constitutes a "launching state" present interpretive difficulties. Members of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) are currently working to 
clarify these issues. For a more detailed recent discussion of the complicated rules on space 
liability in the United States, see Liabikp Rid-Sharing Regime for U.S. Commema/Space Transportation: 
S t 4  and Anabsi~, United States Depamnent of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 
(Apr 2002), available online at <hnp://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/FAALiabilityRiskSharing402.pdf> 
(visited Feb 19, 2005). 
4 Outer Space Treaty, art VIII (cited in note 1). 
5 See Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (1992), art I, 
1825 UN Treaty Ser 1, 333 (1998) (hereinafter ITU Constitution); Instrument amending the 
Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Final Acts of the 
Plenipotentiary Conference (1994), 1996 Austl Treaty Ser 10. 
6 In the United States, the applicability of various Environmental Protection Acts to federal 
government and private activities in outer space remains an open question. It bears note that 
before issuing licenses for commercial space operations, the FAA requires environmental review 
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-190,83 Stat 852, codified at 
42 USC § 4321 (2000). This law is currently applied to impacts on the earth, but the FAA's 
website does observe that this Act espouses a broad commitment to protect, restore, and enhance 
the environment. See <http://ast.faa.gov/Irra/environmental/ ASTBrochurev9021704dks.pdfi. 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 also mandates that federal agencies consider the 
environmental consequences of proposed federal actions. 42 USC 5 4321. 
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the Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Space Station7 and the NASA 
Directive on Space Station Intellectual property8 provide some guidance. This 
issue is discussed in more detail below. 
111. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS AND THE LACK OF 
SOVEREIGNTY IN SPACE 
A number of United Nations Treaty provisions can have an impact on 
property rights in space.' Most notably, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits 
governments from claiming sovereignty over space or for any celestial body.'' 
Therefore, no nation can give its citizens or any other nation exclusive use of 
any territory. But in practice, few nations actually possess capability to access 
celestial bodies, such as the moon or asteroids, which could contain valuable 
resources or function as strategic research locations. Furthermore, because 
equipment launched into space or created in space by a nation (or its citizens) is 
owned by that nation (or citizen) and controlled by that nation's laws, there 
would be an associated right to protect that equipment. The lack of ownership 
of territory in space does not preclude private sector for-profit use of the 
territory nor subject investments in space equipment to the whims of other 
nations. 
Governments may also be held absolutely liable for the actions of their 
citizens in space," although only for terrestrial damage and damage to airplanes 
' Agreement Among the Government of Canada, the Governments of Member States of the 
European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, 
and the Government of the United States Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International 
Space Station (1998) (hereinafter IGA), in Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel and Marietta Benko, eds, Space 
Law: Barit Legal Documents, D.II.4 (Dordrecht 1990). 
Intellectual P m p e q  and the International Space Station: Creation, Use, Transfer, and Ownership and Protection, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of the General Counsel (Sept 19991, 
available online at <http://www.hq.na~a.~ov/ogc/iss/> (visited Feb 19,2005). 
Apart from the Outer Space Treaty, these indude: Liability Convention (cited in note 3); 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (1968), 19 UST 7570 (1969) (hereinafter Rescue Agreement); 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), 28 UST 695 (1978) 
(hereinafter ~ e ~ i s t r i t i o n  Convention); and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979), 1363 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1984) (hereinafter Moon 
Agreement). 
'0 Outer Space Treaty, art I1 (cited in note 1). 
11 States are liable if they qualify as "launching State(s)" under Art I(c) of the Liability Convention, 
which provides the following definition "(i) A State whlch launches or procures the launching of a 
space object; (ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched." Liability 
Convention, art I(c) (cited in note 3). Whether "[a] State which launches or procures the 
launching of a space object" includes a state whose citizens undertake an action in space depends 
critically on the circumstances; the mere fact of a citizen being active in space and thereby causing 
V o L  6 No.  I 
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in flight. However, since transporting equipment or payloads into space requires 
a launch and since virtually any space activity could have an effect on the Earth, 
this ostensibly limited liabfity has prompted government regulation of safety and 
financial responsibility for private activities in space. Because potential liability 
will rise as more private actors enter space, many nations without such licensing 
requirements are currently writing new legislation.'* The principle of space as the 
province of all mankind and using space only for the benefits for mankind is a 
central theme of the international agreements.I3 However, legal scholars 
continue to debate about the precise legal consequences which should be drawn 
from the equation that space, as province of all mankind, should be regarded as 
terra communis as opposed to terra nulliu~,,'~ a conception under which a nation may 
eventually claim sovereignty. However, the Outer Space Treaties prohibit 
nations from recognizing sovereignty claims over celestial bodies. 
The Moon Agreement, the last Outer space Treaty to be adopted, goes 
further by declaring the moon to be the common heritage of mankind.15 This 
terminology suggests that an even higher principle of equity would be applied to 
the moon's surface-if one nation or its citizens were to exploit lunar resources, 
the technology employed to do so and a portion of the proceeds thus garnered 
would have to be shared with all nations. By essentially precluding proprietary 
rights and profits, this scenario would greatly diminish the impetus for 
commercial development. Thus, even with the Moon Agreement's entry into 
force, only eleven states have ratified it, and an addtional five states have signed 
it. None of the sixteen States are major space-faring nations, except for France 
and India, which have signed but not ratified the Treaty. Future enforcement of 
damage does not attach liability to the state of which that individual is a citizen, at least according 
to the Lability Convention. In the United States, the test of whether a company must procure a 
license from the FAA prior to a launch is based not on any particular percentage of ownership, 
but on the more subjective basis of having a controlling interest in the business venture. 49 USC § 
70102.l(c). The f d  text of Chapter 701 (Commercial Space Launch Activities) is avadable online 
at <http://ast.faa.gov/aboutast/70lcomplete.hun> (visited on Mar 25, 2005). 
'2 Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands are currently going through the process of 
writing space laws. See, for example, F.G. von der Dunk, Current and Future Development $National 
Space Law and Pokq, discussion paper presented at the United Nations/Brazil Workshop on Space 
Law, Rio de Janeiro (Nov 22-25, 2004), pending publication by the United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs, Vienna (forthcoming 2005). 
'3 The Outer Space Treaty applies, strictly speaking, to the "exploration and use" of outer space, not 
to outer space as such, although only a fine line distinguishes the two concepts. See Outer Space 
Treaty, art I (cited in note 1). 
'4 A summary of these arguments can be found in Lotta Viikari, From Manganese Nodules to Lunar 
Rego(ith, (T'ublications of the Faculty of Law, University of Lapland, D Series, Rovaniemi 2002). 
'5 Moon Agreement, art 4(1) (cited in note 9). This treaty applies, in strict terms, to "[tlhe moon and 
its natural resources." Id, art 1 l(1). 
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the Moon Agreement's common heritage provisions obviously remains 
questionable. 
Property rights exist in space, even without ownership or territorial rights 
to celestial bodies, although their applicabittty to resource extraction remains a 
contentious issue. Exactly what those rights are and how far they may apply to 
the extraction of resources is still under debate, creating uncertainty for a 
company looking to invest in such ventures. However, given the limitations of 
modern technology and the cost of reaching such remote regions, extracting 
resources from space is a formidable problem. Companies seeking to profit 
from such enterprises must obtain a major subsidy from a governmental entity, 
and only one nation, the United States, has the economic and technological 
capability, although others could achieve it within a decade. At that future time, 
it may become necessary to devise a method of allocating territory in space. 
Negotiations could result in the selection of an international organization 
empowered to oversee such activity and to act as an intermediary between 
national governments and private firms. But while it remains prudent to 
consider such options today, it is premature to implement any solution. 
IV. UNDEFINED, RESTRICTED, OR AMBIGUOUS PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN SPACE 
This section details some problems arising from the imprecise definition of 
property rights in space, particularly with regard to ownership and liability for 
spacecraft, satellites, and other space facilities. These dynamics complicate 
commercial transactions in space as compared to those involving similar 
terrestrial equipment. 
An international system (the ITU regme) presently coordinates the use of 
frequencies. It ensures, in principle and with the stipulation that the parties abide 
by the agreement, avoidance of interference, without actually providing for 
"ownership" of the relevant frequencies.'6 
But since the ITU's formal agreement only confers upon it the authority to 
coordinate frequencies, this system poses other problems. For satellite 
communications, the use of frequencies is inseparable from the orbital slot, 
orbits or orbital planes where the satellite intending to use those frequencies will 
be located." If the satellite concerned is destined for one orbital slot, intended 
' 6  See, for example, ITU Constitution, art 45 (cited in note 5). 
'7 Id, art 44. It may be noted, that in view of their particular nature, for Geostationary ("GEO") 
satellites the term "orbital slot" was coined, whereas for Medium Earth Orbits ("MEO") and Low 
Earth Orbits ("LEO") the terms "orbits" or "orbital planes" are more appropriate. ITU authority 
in the field of coordination of orbits and orbital planes for M E 0  and LEO is less unequivocal 
than for GEO, though it has been now succinctly introduced into the text of art 44. 
86 VoL 6 No. I 
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usage of a particular frequency may cause unacceptable interference with other 
satellite communication activities while usage of the same frequency in a 
different orbital slot may be totally harmless from that perspective. 
Since frequencies cannot be owned at the international level, any orbital 
slot or orbit accompanying these frequencies also cannot be owned, and the 
question that naturally arises is to what extent this absence of the possibility of 
(international legal) ownership of orbital slots or orbits may require solutions for 
reasons not discussed above vis-A-vis frequencies. In other words, do the 
legitimate interests of communication (or other) satellite owners in interference- 
free operation of their satellite necessitate more than protection of their use of 
frequencies, which, as indicated, will almost automatically also address the 
element of use of a particular orbital slot or orbit? 
"Property rights" includes intellectual property rights ("IPR"), both the 
complex amalgam of industrial property rights like patents, and the stn'cto senstl 
right like copyrights, trademarks and database-ownership. In all these cases, 
property ultimately concerns something intangible-the creativity or 
inventiveness entitling the person exercising it to continue to exert a 
considerable measure of control over the "products" of such creativity or 
inventiveness long after those attributes have ceased to be exercised. Intellectual 
property rights are inherently more complicated than property rights in tangible 
goods. Property rights in movables are characterized by a simple structure, 
meaning that minimal problems arise when movables cross frontiers and 
become subject to different jurisdictions and national laws. Property rights in 
immovables by definition remain within one particular jurisdiction, unless the 
territory concerned is transferred to another state. Like their traditional 
counterparts, intellectual property rights are, in the first instance, defined by 
national laws, stipulating the specific conditions entitling one to legal protection 
and the extent and terms of such protection. 
In response to this piecemeal approach, major international efforts early on 
strove to harmonize national laws, or allow for and even stimulate mutual 
recognition of existing IPR awarded on a national basis." Currently, the World 
'8 Thus, for patent rights already in 1883, the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as 
revised (1967), 21 UST 1583 (1970) (hereinafter Paris Convention), with currently over 140 states 
parties; and similarly for copyrights, in 1886, the Berne Convention for the P.-7tection of Literary 
and Artistic Works, as revised (1979), S Treaty Doc No 99-27 (1986) (hereinafter Beme 
Convention), with currently about 130 states parties, was concluded. 
Summer 2005 
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Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") is seeking to further such 
deve l~~ments . '~  
Patent protection, which is grounded upon territoriality, presents special 
problems in the space context. The possibility of registering for protection of an 
invention depends upon the territory where the invention achieved fruition and 
the possibility of enforcing such protection require ascertaining where the 
infringement transpired. Infringement in space largely remains an academic 
matter, while the issue of inventions in outer space poses more difficulties, 
which a number of legal mechanisms endeavor to alleviate; 
In general, under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, states are entitled 
to exercise national jurisdiction on board spacecraft registered with and by them. 
Thus, states launching spacecraft with manned capability, and hence confronting 
the possibility of an individual developing a new invention while in outer space 
may apply their relevant national laws to such spacecraft. Through the Patents in 
Outer Space Act, the United States has accordingly extended the scope of its 
patent legislation to inventions made onboard United States-registered 
spacecraft.20 
The International Space Station ("ISS") currently being assembled in space 
appeared to merit a more sophisticated approach, in view of its international 
character and the envisaged constant movement of astronauts from different 
Partner States across the various, nationally registered elements of the station. 
But participating nations adhered to the typical approach: under Article 21 of the 
IGA,~' for the purposes of applying national IPR legislation, each element of the 
space station registered by a Partner State qualified as "quasi-territory." The 
European module was registered not by individual European countries but by 
the European Space Agency ("ESA") on their behalf, and was accorded sunilar 
treatment: Each ESA member state involved under the IGA was entitled to view 
the ESA module as its "quasi-territory" for the present purpose.22 
' 9  Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (1967), 21 UST 
1749 (1970) (hereinafter WIPO Convention). For example, updating the Universal Copyright 
Convention, as revised Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), 25 UST 1341 (1971); updating the 
Paris Convention, 21 UST 1583 (cited in note 18); and drafting the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(1970), 28 UST 7645 (1979); the Trademark Law Treaty (1994), 1998 Austl Treaty Ser 3, and the 
Copynght Treaty (1996), 36 ILM 65 (1997). 
20 Notably, the US has done so by adding § 105, "Inventions in outer space," to the Patents in 
Outer Space Act, Pub L No 101-580,104 State 2863 (1990), codified at 35 USC § 10 (2000). 
2' See IGA (cited in note 7). 
22 Only Germany has thus far actually undertaken the relevant efforts and extended the scope of its 
national patent protection to inventions made on board the ESA module. See European Space 
Agency, International Space Station Legal Framework, avadable online at 
<http://www.esa.int/export/esaHS/ESAH700VMOC~iss~0.hanl> (visited Feb 22,2005). 
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The only ripe issue in this area thus concerns inventions made in outer 
space but not onboard a spacecraft-in other words, on the surface of the moon 
or another celestial body. The lingering question here is whether inventions 
created on board a lunar facility are covered by the laws of the nation owning 
the facility or if a future agreement concerning the territory upon which the 
facility rests will determine ownershp rights. Since space law presently 
proscribes territorial sovereignty or even quasi-territorial appropriation:3 
solutions specific to this area will need to be devised, preferably before there is a 
return to the moon or before manned missions start landing on other celestial 
bodies. 
The issue of sales, leases, and other transfers of ownership of space 
hardware, presumably while in outer space, is orthogonal to the other issues, 
with the overriding concern being the extent to which legal rules applicable to 
space hardware take the aforementioned transfer possibilities into consideration; 
in other words, a change of ownership causes problems beyond those present 
regardless of who owns the space hardware. 
At the international level, liability for damage resulting from space 
operations is limited to damage caused by "space object[s]," which generally 
means damage caused by physical contact of such an objectz4 and is allocated to 
the "launching State(s)" of that object. Notably, the definition of "launching 
considers ownership (whether private or public) irrelevant. Moreover, 
defining a liable entity based on the launch results in the consequence of "once a 
liable state, always a liable state." 
This results because even after space hardware changes hands in outer 
space, the originally liable state(s) will, under the Liability Convention, remain so 
until the space object under consideration ceases to exist, even if the space 
hardware concerns a complete satehte (space object), which, after its sale-in- 
orbit, no longer remains under any control of the original launching State(s). 
Liability can then be avoided by incorporating derogation clauses into the 
contract of sale, but such constructions might be cumbersome and ultimately 
23 See the brief discussion on art I1 of the Outer Space Treaty in section I11 of this article. 
24 See Liability Convention, arts 11,111 (cited in note 3). Moreover, damage recompensable under the 
Convention is limited to "loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or 
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international 
intergovernmental organizations." Id, art I(a). 
25 The term "launching State" means: "(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a 
space object; (ii) A State from whose temtory or facility a space object is launched." Id, art I(c). 
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detrimental to the commercial utilization of space. Obviously, when a 
comprehensive change of ownership fails to impinge upon the determination of 
the liable entity or entities, partial ownership transfers also do not result in any 
pertinent change. 
Mtltati~ mtltandis, private ownership as such is, at the first international level, 
not relevant at all, given that liability rests with the launching State(s). Such state 
or states must thereby ensure that any private party involved in satellite 
communications could be obligated, ordinarily under a license, to reimburse the 
government(s) for international claims under the Liability Convention, if the 
damage at issue can be attributed to that private party's involvement. Since a 
change in private ownership does not alone result in any change in this respect, 
the interested governments must make sure that any new owner would be 
subject to the same rules. 
This situation naturally leads one to consider whether commercial space 
activities would ultimately benefit if a coherent international liability regime 
attributed liability to the entity (whether public or private) actually in charge and 
in control at the moment when the activity causing damage at issue occurred, as 
contrasted to the current system which ' designates a launching State(s) or  
authority liable. Or  should the freedom to arrange for such cases on an ad hoc 
basis principally remain, only to be circumscribed by those governments that 
may ultimately have to bear the international consequences in terms of liability? 
The efforts currently undertaken in the context of UNIDROIT~~ to arrive 
at a protocol on securities for spacecraft figure prominently for the future of 
commercial space, but since the protocol will merely activate the underlying 
Convention for the area of space activities, it will not alter property rights 
themselves. The protocol first endeavors to provide for an international register 
of interests in highly mobile, highly valuable equipment, in this case spacecraft 
and key components thereof. In the international environment of space 
activities, such measures are intended to enhance the transparency of rights and 
duties resting, in terms of securities. 
Second, the Protocol embodies efforts to increase the coherence of, and, 
perhaps even harmonize, national regimes, potentially through international 
intervention in actual disputes on financing and securities. But, as in other cases, 
national regimes remain the focus of attention, particularly with regard to their 
definitions of ownership, property rights, and other special rights in space 
26 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (2001), ICAO Doc 9793 (Nov 16, 
2001), available online at <http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/rnobile- 
equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf> (visited Feb 20, 2005) (hereinafter Capetown Convenrion); 
Prelimnary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets, UNIDROIT 2003 CGE Space 
Pr/l/WP 3, vi, available online at <http://www.unidroit.org/english/workprograrnme/ 
study072/study072j/72j-13rev-e.pdO (visited Feb 19,2005). 
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equipment. Until a protocol successfully overrides substantive national law on 
such issues, an international regime governing space equipment property rights 
remains unlikely. Current negotiations, as encapsulated in present draft texts 
with a plethora of opt-in and opt-out clauses, confirm the marginal likelihood or 
even feasibility of a comprehensive approach in this field in the near future. 
V. FIRMS A R E  PRIMARILY CONCERNED W I T H  P R O F I T S ,  NOT 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Corporations exist to make profits, and property rights only matter to the 
extent that they are necessary to fulfill the objective of maximizing profit. 
Popular literature and the statements of corporate executives gives the 
impression that unless companies can obtain ownershp to space territory, they 
will not be able to invest in space activities profitably. But in the reasonably near 
future, no company operating in space will likely need outright ownership of 
space territory, including land on the moon. Arguments affecting today's 
businesses about the ownership of space territory only directly apply to 
businesses currently attempting to sell plots of space territory to unsuspecting 
citizens, activities directly violating long-standing space treaties. 
It is possible to conceive serious business ventures building hotels on the 
moon, mining resources from the moon and asteroids, and offering other space- 
based end-user products. There have been numerous business plans written for 
these types of ventures, most of which have resulted in little more than paper 
dreams. However, as space technologies mature, entrepreneurs are becoming 
more serious about these types of investments. 
Meanwhile, some taxing authorities have even attempted to treat currently 
orbiting satellites as space property that would be taxable in their jurisdiction. 
For example, a Los Angeles County Assessor recently proposed a tax on eight 
communications satellites in geostationary orbit owned by Hughes Electronics 
~ 0 1 - p . ~ ~  Examples of more extreme business activities claiming space territorial 
ownership include: 
Several people in the 1950s claiming ownership of the moon, sending 
the declaration of ownership to the United Nations or national 
governments, with some "se&ng7' lunar territory for one dollar per acre. 
27 Assessor Losex Latest Bid to Tax Sate//ifes, LA Times B6 (Sept 28, 2001). Proponents of the tax 
argued that because Hughes was located in California, the satellites were movable property 
currently located out of state, much like heavy construction equipment subject to taxation. 
However, the California State Board of Equalization ruled that the satellttes were not launched 
from California, do not fly over California, nor will they ever return to California, and therefore 
should not be taxed as California property. 
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A 1980 claim by Dennis Hope who is selling an acre on the moon for 
$19.99, plus $1.51 "lunar tax." 
A claim for the asteroid Eros made by Gregory Nemitz by filing 
documents in a US district 
Legal certainty is critical here, and it may be gradually but gravely 
undermined by any such claims advancing without substantial and authoritative 
opposition. But while "ownership" of a part of the moon may be considered a 
joke to well-informed space lawyers or many others with proper intuition, the 
number of people "buying" moon plots has risen to many thousands, and these 
individuals probably believe that they possess a vested interest in lunar territory, 
a position that might engender conflicts with.prospective private ventures. For 
example, purported "owners" may decide not to refrain from using their 
"ownership" rights to stake a claim for minerals extracted from "their" plot, 
thus stifling bona fide private ventures to undertake mining activities. Some 
years ago, a few United States companies were seriously investigating 
opportunities to use Australian territory for return of their unmanned mining 
expeditions-and then backed off when finding out that Australia was one of 
the parties to the Moon Agreement, and thus envisaging a risk that Australian 
authorities would confiscate any minerals returned from outer space since 
Australian officials might feel compelled to act under their obligation to adhere 
to the Common Heritage principle enshrined in the Moon Agreement. As a 
consequence, now is the time to raise the awareness of the relevant government 
and other authorities to the appropriateness of undertaking counteractions 
against such activities, to serve both legal certainty and a prospective beneficial 
further development of space activities focused on the moon and other celestial 
bodies. 
When profitable space business ventures are technologically and financially 
feasible, companies are able to obtain private financing. Billions of dollars were 
obtained through traditional investment banking houses to fund the very active 
satellite communications ventures of the late 1990s. These ventures did not 
involve territorial rights in space as would a venture to perform mining 
operations on the moon, but they did involve very risky, high up-front capital 
funds and a long-term commitment to space satellites. 
On the near future horizon there are companies such as Scaled Composites 
(along with Richard Branson's Virgin Galactic), the recent winner of the " X  
prize, or Space X who are proposing suborbital human flights (space "tourism") 
and eventually orbital flights. These innovative and creative firms have found 
28 Margie Wylie, Questions of Propeq Rightr M q  Bedevil Pn'uate Ventunr in Space, Newhouse News 
Service (Feb 11, 2004), av~ulable online at <http://www.newhousenews.com/arc~ve/ 
wylie021204.html> (visited Feb 19, 2005). 
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start-up financing from both private sources and through relatively small 
government contracts. Assuming that the development plans of these companies 
continue to achteve technical success, that they avoid catastrophic accidents, and 
that they can demonstrate a viable business and marketing plan, it is likely they 
will be able to generate significant private investment f~nds.~%owever, these 
commercial activities do not involve property rights issues, at least in the near 
future. Other business opportunities in space such as orbital manufacturing or 
orbital energy production also do not directly involve territorial property rights3' 
Firms today with their sights on deep space exploration have far more 
serious problems than property rights issues. They cannot and will not succeed 
without passing normal business planning tests. There are several unforgiving 
aspects to space business ventures. First, the cost of access to space will remain 
very high-prohibitive for any type of private activity that requires frequent trips 
up and back. Second, the resources on the moon or asteroids have to be shown 
to be valuable enough to either find a way to use them on-site or to return them 
to earth. This has not been demonstrated as yet. Third, a significant era of 
research and development will have to take place before the methods of mining, 
using, and transporting these resources w d  be perfected and will pass safety and 
environmental regulations. That era, if it is anytlxng like past ones, will be 
characterized by government involvement and oversight. This would result in 
property rights issues being postponed indefinitely until governments are willing 
to turn over the operations. Also, under government jurisdiction or partnershtps, 
the issues of property rights will be handled by government agencies, not by 
private entities. 
These have to be viewed in the perspective of true business plans and they 
have to be subjected to careful scrutiny for near or intermediate-term economic 
prospects. These types of private activities have been proposed many times over 
the years. Not one has yet resulted in anything more than paper plans. 
Second, no private company can operate in space without the consent and 
regulation of at least one governmental entity because, by treaty, every space- 
faring nation has agreed that each government will ultimately be liable for the 
actions of its citi~ens.~' This potential large liability has necessitated a licensing 
and regulatory system to be established in many nations to protect government 
funds. Although these systems are not identical in each nation (and some nations 
29 This is not a foregone conclusion. A number of firms receiving financing have discovered that 
their capital needs far surpass original projections and/or that their estimate of the market for 
space activities has far exceeded the actual market. 
30 See, for example, Sam Dinkjn, Don't Waitfor Propee Rights, The Space Review (July 12, 2004), 
available online at <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/l79/l (visited Feb 22, 2005). 
31 Liability Convention, arts 11, I11 (cited in note 3). 
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do not have adequate systems in place at the present time), the threat of a large 
public payout from private activities has resulted in government involvement in 
every major space nation. Government involvement virtually mandates some 
form of partnership arrangement with private companies wishing to operate in 
space and, in today's environment, also means close scrutiny for security 
reasons. 
VI. TERRESTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND 
There are many different forms of property rights, each defined by a 
nation's culture, history, and political priorities. Ownership over immovable 
property is not a self-evident phenomenon, defined by natural law or &vine 
intervention; it is a concept provided for by national laws that elaborate it in 
their own fashion as to all relevant details. Under the old communist legal 
system prevailing in the Soviet Union. and its allies, it was legally impossible for a 
private person to own immovable property. Similarly, how a private person can 
come to own real what his rights and obligations are in respect of such 
real estate,33 and how he can be disowned in case of overriding public interests? 
are all determined by the relevant national law-and this often in quite dfferent 
fashion. 
In view of the fundamental ties of real estate to territory, also in the 
international legal sense, such national laws apply exclusively on a territorial 
basis. Dutch laws on private ownership of immovable property apply to Dutch 
territory, US laws to US territory, and so on. In other words, national law, and 
any claim based upon registration under it, is irrelevant with respect to 
determining possible private ownership of "real estate" on the moon.35 
A f d  list of the options available to ordinary businesses in handling the 
property upon which they produce goods and services is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, many businesses do not own the land or the buildings they 
use in production. Beyond outright purchase of the land they can lease the 
facilities or be part of a condominium arrangement, among other options. Of 
course, underlying these arrangements, there is a landowner who operates under 
national laws and can grant exclusive rights. But there are examples of successful 
business operations in nations that prohibited ownership of land to their 
32 For example, by depositing a claim that goes unchallenged for a specified period of time, or by 
inheriting a relevant document. 
33 For example, valuable minerals or historical treasures found on immovable property; compare the 
concepts of "right of way" and "private passage," which sometimes rest upon real estate. 
34 For example, when a high-speed railway line or motorway needs to be built. Substantive law in 
this area includes procedural rules and entitlement to compensation. 
35 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art 27,1155 UN Treaty Ser 331 (1980). 
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citizens. In the former Soviet Union foreign companies investing in production 
facilities were guaranteed rights by an intermediary government organization set 
up for the purpose. 
Eventually, when true private business operations are feasible on the moon 
or on asteroids, there will have to be some form.of intermediary established to 
guarantee the right to use the territory. Debating the form and type of 
agreements needed for an intermediary should be reserved for the future time, 
when more is known about the types and value of the space resources in 
question. Only then can a meaningful arrangement be worked out. Since these 
potential business ventures are well beyond the five to ten-year normal business 
planning horizon, there is little need to attack the specifics of such arrangements 
today. 
VII. RELATED ISSUES I N  OTHER SECTORS A N D  TREATIES 
A basic premise of the United Nations Treaties is that space should be 
used for the benefit of all mankind. Since governments were the prime 
negotiators of these treaties and the only participants in space activities during 
the 1960s (outside of a few heavily regulated private telecommunications 
satellites), and since the main thrust of space activity was science and 
exploration, the anticipated benefits were an expansion of the scientific 
knowledge base and spin-off technologies. Not much thought was given to 
serious private enterprise and entrepreneurial activity in space.3G 
The preamble to The NASA Act of 1958 (which preceded the above 
mentioned UN Treaties by nearly ten years) states: "The Congress hereby 
declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be 
devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind."37 It should be 
noted that although this was official US policy and theoretically would apply to 
all US space activities, similar statements do not appear in the legislative charter 
of other US agencies dealing with space issues. In particular, the security and 
defense uses of space cannot always be for "peaceful purposes," although those 
activities still fall well within the Treaty obligations.38 Until the early 1980s the 
36 Although the compromise clause creating governmental liability for the actions of its citizens in 
space was drafted in response to Soviet opposition to the involvement of private firms in space 
activities. See Carl Q. Christol, Deuelapment $Current Outer Space LAW, Symposium on Commercial 
Opportunities in Space: Roles of Developing Countries, Taipei, Taiwan, China (Apr 21,1987). 
37 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, $ 102(a), Pub L No 85-568,72 Stat 426, codified at 
42 USC § 2451 (2000). 
3s The Treaties prohibit nonpeaceful uses of space as well as weapons of mass destruction in space. 
But using space for observations, communications, and other activities that have dual purposes is 
not a violation of the provisions. 
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US space budget was primarily dominated by NASA. In more recent years, 
Department of Defense expenditures on space technologies are now greater 
than NASA's.~' 
An extension of the benefits to all mankind principle is the Common 
Heritage of  ank kind.^' This raises many complex issues since the core of this 
idea is that all nations should benefit from the knowledge and technology (and 
profits) generated by using resources in space. Essentially, it is a provision 
advocated by nations that do not currently have the ability to access these 
resources on their own and in the application of this idea, richer nations would 
share with all other nations. Quite naturally, commercial interests in the 
wealthier nations do not support this since it would mean the sharing of 
proprietary technology as well as reduce potential profits. Both, they argue, are 
needed to develop the high-risk/high-reward potential of outer space resources. 
Similar issues have been addressed in the past. The Law of the Seas 
~ r e a t y ~ '  includes the principles of Common Heritage. The United States only 
started to consider ratification of this Treaty after a 1994 New York Protocol 
had de facto considerably changed the originally envisaged elaboration and 
implementation of Common Heritage while formally maintaining the basic 
principle.42 One factor is that potentially valuable resources have been located in 
the deep-sea bed and companies are actively developing technologies to mine 
these resources. The Moon Agreement also incorporates this language. As 
described above, only a very few nations have ratified this space treaty; none of 
them are major space-faring nations. Again, there are resources on the moon 
that may have significant economic value sometime in the future and nations are 
pressured by their firms to withhold signing away valuable rights. Another 
similar issue arises with environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although all nations are aware of the necessity to address environmental 
problems, the United States has not been wilting to sign a treaty that will cost its 
firms significant lost income. 
The example of the Antarctic Treaty43 is mainly relevant with a view to 
research facilities, since when it comes to commercial exploitation, the situation 
39 NASA, Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, FY 2003, Appendix E-lA, 139. 
40 See section I11 of this article. 
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), 1833 UN Treaty Ser 3, 397 preamble 
(1994). 
42 See Ambassador Sichan Siv, US Representative on the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Statement in the General Assembly on Oceans and Law of the Sea, Statement on Oceans 
and Law of the Sea (Nov 27, 2001), available online at 
<http://www.~tate.~ov/g/oes/rls/rm/6796.h (visited Feb 21,2005). 
43 Antarctic Treaty (1 959), 12 UST 794 (1 962). 
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has developed in quite a different direction. With the recent Madrid Protocol,44 
the only form of commercial exploitation currently allowed on the continent is 
that of tourism; all mineral exploitation is completely banned for the next fifty 
years (counting from the entry into force of the Madrid Protocol in 1998, so the 
"deadline" here is 2048), and that ban can only be lifted thereafter by complete 
consent of all the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid 
Protocol, which includes all important states-in other words, those who make 
a substantial effort with respect to the area concerned and are hence entitled, 
under general international law principles, to a considerably larger voice in 
determining at the international level an applicable legal regime.45 
The doubtful legal status of Antarctica as it originally arose from the 1959 
Treaty (neither terra commtlnis since a number of states formally still uphold their 
claims over sections of the continent, nor part of national territories or terra 
ntlllitls, since a number of other states vehemently do not agree to any such 
claims) has thus, as far as commercial exploitation is concerned, been overtaken, 
de facto superseded, or made irrelevant by that ban. Only if a total ban of 
commercial activities in space would be the aim, therefore, would following the 
example of Antarctica make sense. 
As long as the potential for valuable economic resources on the moon 
exists and the possibility that private firms can make a business out of using 
those resources, it is highly unlikely that the major space faring nations will ever 
agree to a Common Heritage agreement for the moon. The investment and risks 
involved in getting there and using those resources is just too large to sustain 
such a business activity without realizing as great as possible future profits. 
Although governments may continue to develop plans to perform research on 
the moon under a Common Heritage agreement, companies would not without 
some assurance of the ability to recover a reasonable return on their 
investments. The current policy positions of the United States and many other 
major space-faring nations advocate partnership agreements between 
governments and private enterprise in future exploration. It is conceivable that 
governments could agree to subsidize companies for lost profits from a treaty 
agreement, but given the present budget pressures on space exploration, in 
practice this will not likely occur. 
Sovereignty, therefore, is not the issue. Many ways have been used to 
overcome the lack of property ownership. Profits are the issue, and unless and 
until a way of assuring private enterprises that their investments in research and 
development, equipment, and operations in space can be recovered, the 
44 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), art 7, 30 ILM 1455, 1464 
(hereinafter Madrid Protocol). 
45 Id, art 25. 
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insecurity and risks of not having an operating mechanism for establishing these 
rights will impede the fast growth of commercial space.46 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
There is no particular commercial problem currently or in the foreseeable 
future where the lack of sovereignty plays a sipficant role. Current issues, 
therefore, revolve around two problems: first, the premature concerns and fears 
of some entrepreneurs, and second, the proper enforcement by governments of 
fly-by-night organizations that may influence public opinion and set illegal 
precedents that will be difficult to reverse if not stopped. 
When private sector commercial interests are really at stake, there are 
terrestrial models that can be adopted and agreed upon that retain the principle 
of lack of sovereignty whde providing assurance to firms of the ability to use real 
property in space and to appropriate profits from the use of the property. 
The only serious commercial issue that this conclusion does not directly 
address is that space laws and regulations provide a long-term planning horizon 
that is stable and predictable. However, the future is not easily predictable, 
especially for a location as hazardous and hostile as the space environment. And 
since there are a wide variety of national property laws across the many nations 
of the world, there clearly is no one set of laws that would or could be evenly 
applied in space. The ISS is a good example of the delicate negotiations 
regarding property rights. The solution was to allow each participating nation to 
apply its own laws to its own modules, a less than ideal compromise in a 
situation where borders are often not clear 
When a company has a product or service that is tested and ready for the 
market, governments most often find a way to allow it to operate. The Concorde 
is a good example from the aerospace industry. Here, new technology required 
many waivers of existing aerospace regulations to be granted. From technical 
certification issues to environmental concerns, United States and European 
regulators eventually found a way to grant a certificate of flight-worthiness. Over 
the twenty-five years of operations, these "waivers" were the mechanism for the 
Concorde's operations. 
Commercial space operations in the future will probably follow a similar 
path. When a new good or service has evolved beyond the experimental and 
prototype stages, a method to allow its operation will be negotiated and 
approved, assuming that safety, environmental, and other issues are satisfactorily 
Of course, having those rights does not guarantee a profit or even that a private investment will 
be made. I t  only removes one additional risk factor from the equation. In fact, there are many far 
more significant financial, technical, and environmental problems with private space activity. 
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addressed. It is true that this is time-consuming and expensive. However, it may 
be the only way that a set of acceptable rules can evolve into a workable long- 
term regime for property rights in space. 
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